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"What happens when you don't measure up."
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Presentation Topics
1. What is metrology
2. Measurement related risks and their consequences
All measurement decisions have consequences...
You get judged by English Common Law. You are innocent until proven guilty. Your
measurements must be judged by Napoleonic Law. They are guilty until proven innocent.
Prof Emeritus Peter Stein
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Metrology and Measurement Data
Metrology is the "science of measurement and its application" (JCGM 200:2008).
• This includes all theoretical and practical aspects of measurement
Measurements =Decisions
Measurement data support decisions to...
Establish research or investigative fact
Establish scientific or lega I fact
Accept or reject a product
Rework or complete a design
Take corrective action or withhold it
Continue or stop a process (including a space launch)
The objective ofthe design and control ofmeasurement processes is to
manage the risks taken in making decisions based on measurement data.
NASA Reference PubliClllion 1342
Metro~' - C3librntion 3lld MeOSurtmtnl Processes Guidelines
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The international definition of metrology is the science of measurement. In the
simplest terms, metrology provides the measurement data used to make decisions, and
the quality of the decision is directly proportional to the quality of the measurement
data.
The old computer adage, "garbage in, garbage out" applies to decision processes where
measurement data is involved; bad measurement data can lead to bad decisions.
The measurement data used by NASA can be critical to decisions which affect
everything from a program's economic success, to its mission success. Measurement
data influences design decisions, acceptance or rejection decisions, and even launch
decisions.
Before measuring, there are two important questions that need to be answered: How
good does the measurement need to be? How good can the measurement be made?
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Product or System Risk: The
negative consequence of an
incorrect measurement-based
decision
• Quality or performance of end-
products
• Increased cost of measurements
without added value
Measurement Risk through a Project Lifecycle
In metrology, risk occurs as:
Measurement-related Risk: Risk
of making incorrect
measurement-based decisions
• Based on measurement process
limitations or process mistakes
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This figure illustrates measurement versus product/system risk through a lifecycle. The negative impact
of measurement decisions can carry through the entire lifecycle; therefore, managing measurement-
based risks during each phase of the lifecycle is an essential part of a quality system.
NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements
2.3.1.1 Project formulation consists of two sequential phases, traditionally denoted as Phases A (Concept
& Technology Development) and B (Preliminary Design & Technology Completion). The primary activities
in these phases are to develop and define the project requirements and cost/schedule basis and to
design a plan for implementation (including an acquisition strategy, contractor selection, and long-lead
procurement). While not formally a part of formulation, some formulation-type activities will naturally
occur as part of earlier advanced studies. These fall into a part of the project life cycle known as Pre-
Phase A (Concept Studies).
2.3.i.2 Project implementation consists of Phases C, D, E, and F. Approval marks the transition from
Phase B of formulation to Phase C of implementation. During Phases C (Final Design and Fabrication) and
D (System Assembly, Integration and Test, and Launch), the primary activities are developmental in
nature, including acquisition contract execution. Phase C includes the fabrication and testing of
components, assemblies, and subsystems. All activities are executed as per the Project Plan developed
during formulation. The transition from Phase C to Phase D is uniquely a "soft gate," in which the project
may initiate Phase D work immediately upon completion of the Phase C work products, absent a notice
of discontinuance by the Program Manager (rather than waiting for affirmative direction from the
Program Manager to begin Phase D). The start of Phase E (Operations and Sustainment) marks the
transition from system development and acquisition activities to primarily systems operations and
sustainment activities. In Phase F (Closeout), project systems are taken out of service and safely disposed,
although scientific and other analyses might still continue under project funding. Independent evaluation
activities occur throughout all phases.
---------------------_.__._---------
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Measurement Risk and End-item Performance
Measurement uncertainty
Nominal Value
Utility Range without margins
Point of complete
loss of utility
Xl~-Xf
Start of degraded
perfonnance
I+-----\-- Tolerance Limits --~.I
Measurement uncertainty
/ ~d ___II Double measurement
uncertainty
Area of degraded
performance
Nominal Value
Utility Range with margins
Measurement uncertainty
is inherent to the process
or instruments and does
not include mistakes, or
process escapes
~ Over specification of requirements costs money...
~ However, under specification can be hazardous
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NOlUiul
Probability of Incorrect Measurement Decisions
Measurement Uncertainty: The doubt that exists about a measurement's result
• Every measurement-even the most careful-always has a margin of doubt
• Uncertainty is the inherent limitation of a measurement process, due to instrumentation
and process variation
• Measurement uncertainty does not include mistakes or process escapes
The probability of an incorrect decision is determined by:
• The amount of uncertainty in the measurement process
• Where the measurement result lies with respect to the tolerance limit (e.g., ± L)
• Knowledge acquired from previous measurements of similar items (Le., a priori
distribution)
r~. Probability of being__ out-{)f·tolerance +L
A
Nominal
" Range of possible values at
95% confidence
·L
-I
·l
Page 6 of 19
Decision rules, such as the 10:1 and 4:1 are designed around this concept.
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Essential Components of "Good" Measurement Data
Three essential components are required for measurements to adequately support
decisions in a cost-effective manner
1. "Good requirements" - Reasonable measurement tolerances that are based on
system performance
2. "Good equipment" - Measuring and test equipment that is properly calibrated
3. "Good measurements" - End-user measurement processes/procedures that
adequately support the end-product performance requirements
Like the legs ofa three-legged stool, all three components are
necessOlY·
Ifone leg is missing, the risk that the stool will fall over
increases; likewise, the risk ofan incorrect decision increases
dramatically ifone ofthese components is missing.
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NASA's metrology policy is to "Control measurement processes to ensure the accuracy of measurement results
affecting safety and mission success." Traditionally, "measurement controf' has focused on the calibration of
instruments, and although vital, instrument calibration alone does not ensure accurate measurement data. A
"perfect" instrument does not guarantee a "good" measurement. Such assurance can only come from the proper
and appropriate application of measurement controls. Measurement controls fall into three basic categories.
Measurement requirements - Establishing reasonable measurement requirements that are based on system
performance is the foundation for making good measurement-based decisions. Without this link, the cost of
verifying the measurement requirements can increase without adding value, or worse, verification of the design
performance may not be adequate. In the absence of specified measurement requirements (e.g., research), it is
imperative to document the quality of the measurement. (link to AS9100, 7.3.3 & 8.2.4)
Measuring Instruments -In addition to the proper selection, care, and use of measuring instruments, it is vital to
periodically verify that measuring instruments are performing to their specifications. Calibration is the
measurement control for ensuring instrument accuracy. Calibration establishes the link for a given measurement to
the national or international standard for that unit of measure. Calibration provides traceability, ensuring that
measurements made at a particular place and time can be meaningfully compared with those made at other places
and/or at other times. There are three basic forms of calibration:
Laboratory calibration
In-situ calibration
Instrument verification, also called "user calibrations,"
(link to AS9100, 7.6)
Measurement Processes - Adequate measurement processes/procedures are necessary to control errors which
could lead to incorrect decisions based on measurement data. Even with a properly calibrated instrument, there are
other factors that can introduce errors into the measurement process larger than the instrument accuracy. To
ensure accuracies sufficient to support quality decisions, measurement procedures must be developed which
adequately account for, or manage all relevant error sources in the measurement process. Examples of potential
error sources are:
Environmental
Instrument resolution,
Operator competency and bias
Repeatability
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Case Study 1 - Space Shuttle Measurement Assessments
KSC-&OOSSe.tl&tIe,GSE Follow-on Assessment
97.4% non-compliant with Program requirement ,., _
• 86.4% non-compliant with "good" measurement practices '" t-tI__---------I1
• Components 1 & 3
Shuttle Discovery (STS-121) Assessment
• 67.0% non-compliant with Program requirement
• 40.3% non-compliant with "good" measurement practices
• Components 1 & 3
Two measurement-related Independent Assessments
1. Shuttle Discovery's 2nd post-Columbia return to flight
2. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) follow-on
Engineering review indicated all measurements were acceptable due to large
margins bUilt into the Shuttle systems
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During a walk-down of Kennedy Space Center Shuttle processing areas by Safety and Mission
Assurance personnel, it became apparent there was a general lack of awareness of the Shuttle
requirements for measurement assurance. NSTS 5300.4 (10-2) requires that measurement
uncertainty be no more than ten percent of the required tolerance of a measurement. The lack
of knowledge of this requirement raised questions about whether required measurement
assurance had been maintained for the STS-121 hardware. A short-term assessment was
conducted to review measurements accomplished, and to estimate the degree of non-
compliance and the potential implications for the STS-121 mission.
The assessment was conducted by developing a catalog of over 28000 precision measurements
made for STS-121 flight hardware. From this list, a statistically relevant sample of 367
randomly-selected measurements was developed. For these items, the specified tolerance and
the measurement uncertainty were recorded. The tolerance-to-uncertainty ratio was then
calculated. Those with a ratio less than 10:1 (NSTS requirement) were analyzed to determine
the likelihood of the measurement being out of tolerance. Of the 367 sampled measurements,
76 or 21% were found to have ratios of 2:1 or less. These measurements were judged to have
a significant likelihood of being out of tolerance and were sent to engineering for an evaluation
of the possible impact to Shuttle safety.
Engineering evaluations on the 76 items determined that margins built into the Shuttle
hardware would absorb the risk posed by the possible out of tolerance measurements. While
this report indicated that no immediate threats to Shuttle safety were found, not all
measurements were checked, and the assessment results cannot be used as a guarantee that
threats do not exist. Consequently, there is some risk in using the results as justification for
continuing with the current measurement process. At the same time, the fact that no
measurement accuracies raised concerns from engineering indicates that the universal
application ofthe 10:1 ratio requirement may be overly restrictive.
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Case Study 1 - Space Shuttle Measurement Assessments
Two measurement-related Independent Assessments
1. Shuttle Discovery's 2nd post-Columbia return to flight
2. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) follow-on
Shuttle Discovery (5T5-121) Assessment
• 67.0% non-compliant with Program requirement
• 40.3% non-compliant with "good" measurement practices
G5E Follow-on Assessment
• 97.4% non-compliant with Program requirement
• 86.4% non-compliant with "good" measurement practices
-x x
~ Non-compliance to measurement requirements is a Component 3 issue
~ Although large design margins seemed to compensate for non-compliance, lack
of documentation (Component 1) fostered complacency and left a potential for
hidden threats
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Case Study 2 - Passive Latch Torque - Component 1
The International Space Station and the Docked Space Shuttle Endeavour
ISS027-E-036793 (23 May 2011) --- This image of the International Space Station and the
docked space shuttle Endeavour, flying at an altitude of approximately 220 miles, was taken by
Expedition 27 crew member Paolo Nespoli from the Soyuz TMA-20 following its undocking on
May 23, 2011 (USA time).
In the close-up, the Endeavour's docking module is visible.
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Case Study 2 - Passive Latch Torque - Component 1
4 Latches Secure Airlock to Shuttle Close up of Latch Bolt
Over specification of original Shuttle measurement design requirements led to an
expensive redesign of a failed torque system
1. Measurement requirement for latch bolt torque: 8/000-8/500 inch-Ibs
• Only lower torque limit linked to design requirements (maximum flight load)
2. Permissible bolt torque range per NASA standards: 8/000-10/200 inch-Ibs
3. Acceptable latch bolt torque for typical flight loads: 6/580-10/200 inch-Ibs
Application of existing NASA or Industry standards would have allowed the use of
off-the-shelf torque systems that were readily available
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Failure of the specially designed torque multipliers required a complete redesign and flight
waivers for three 5pace 5huttle missions
Excerpt from A70-l0Sl Torque Multiplier S06338SA Waiver Extension, March 23, 2007, to
add extension effectivity to include 5T5-118
The V073-340177-013/14 passive latch is certified for a design limit +Z trunnion load of
121,000 pounds at a design flight torque of 8000-8500 inch-pounds.
The A70-1051 torque multipliers may not produce correct flight torque in passive latch bolts.
CAR KG0077 was taken to document the absence of verified repeatable output torque. The
A70-1051 serial number 004 was used to torque all four External Airlock latches installed in QV-
105 for flight 20 for 5T5-118.
An analysis of variance test conducted on 3/8/2006 indicates a 99.7% probability that the
output torque from the serial number 004 torque multiplier was between 6780 and 10,900
inch-pounds.
Per Design Center Loads and Dynamics Verification Loads Analysis, 5T5-118 calculated
maximum External Airlock trunnion flight load will be 13,714 pounds.
Per Design Center 5tress assessment, a passive latch torqued to 6580 inch-pounds will restrain
a trunnion load 62,400 pounds.
Per Design Center M&P fastener assessment, a high torque of 10,900 inch-pounds is
permissible.
Therefore, the torque applied to the External Airlock latches is sufficient to ensure the latches
will function per design intent for 5T5-118.
Rationale has been coordinated with the Payload Accommodations PRT.
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Case Study 3 - BP's Texas City Refinery - March 23, 2005
Moments before and immediately after the explosion
Houston, Texas, March 20, 2007 - In a 33s-page final report released today, federal
investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) conclude that
"organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels ofthe BP Corporation" caused
the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery, the worst industrial
accident in the United States since 1990. The report calls on the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to increase inspection and enforcement at
U.S. oil refineries and chemical plants, and to require these corporations to evaluate
the safety impact of mergers, reorganizations, downsizing, and budget cuts.
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Case Study 3 - BP's Texas City Refinery (continued)
The Accident:
• Distillation tower and
attached blowdown drum
overfilled
• ~7600 gallons flammable
liquid released
• Liquid ignited by an idling
diesel truck
Proximate cause:
• High-level alarm
malfunctioned
• Level transmitter
miscalibrated
• Outdated 1975 data sheet
• level transmitter indicated
liquid level falling
• level actually rising rapidly
ComponentZ
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(5B Investigator Mark Kaszniak, who led the (5B's vapor and blast modeling effort,
stated, "The (5B was able to calculate that approximately 7,600 gallons of flammable
liquid hydrocarbons - nearly the equivalent of a full tanker truck of gasoline - were
release from the top of the blowdown drum stack in just under two minutes." The
ejected liquid rapidly vaporized due to evaporation, wind dispersion, and contact with
the surface of nearby equipment. High overpressures from the resulting vapor cloud
explosion totally destroyed 13 trailers and damaged 27 others. People inside trailers
were injured as far as 479 feet away from the blowdown drum, and trailers nearly 1000
feet away sustained damage.
Although a high tower liquid level alarm did activate in the control room in the early
morning hours, a second high level alarm malfunctioned and the faulty tower level
transmitter later indicated that the liquid level was below nine feet and falling. The
normal liquid level in the tower was six-and-a-halffeet. Unknown to operators, the
level was actually rising rapidly, reaching 158 feet by 1 p.m. on March 23, twenty
minutes before the explosion. The (5B determined that the level transmitter was
miscalibrated, using a setting from outdated data sheets that likely had not been
updated since 1975.
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Case Study 3 - BP's Texas City Refinery (continued)
Root causes:
• Cost-cutting, production
pressures, and failure to
invest
• Lack of preventative
maintenance and safety
training
• Procedural
workarounds to
compensate for the
deteriorating
equipment
Component 3
The Cost:
- lS deaths,
- 180 injured
- Over $2 billion, including
lawsuits
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BP acquired the Texas City refinery when it merged with Amoco in 1999. The CSB report
found that "cost-cutting in the 1990s by Amoco and then BP left the Texas City refinery
vulnerable to a catastrophe." Shortly after acquiring Amoco, the BP Group Chief
Executive ordered an across-the-budget 25% cut in fixed spending at the corporation's
refineries. The impact of the cost cuts is detailed in many of the more than 20 key
investigative documents the CSB made public today, including internal BP safety audits,
reviews, and emails. Among other things, cost considerations discouraged refinery
officials from replacing the blowdown drum with a flare system, which the CSB
previously determined would have prevented or greatly minimized the severity of the
accident.
Chairman Merritt said, "The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures, and
failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery. Beginning
in 2002, BP commissioned a series of audits and studies that revealed serious safety
problems at the Texas City refinery, including a lack of necessary preventative
maintenance and training. These audits and studies were shared with BP executives in
London, and were provided to at least one member of the executive board. BP's
response was too little and too late. Some additional investments were made, but they
did not address the core problems in Texas City. In 2004, BP executives challenged their
refineries to cut yet another 25% from their budgets for the following year."
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Case Study 4 - Air Force B-2A Crash
The loss of the U.S. Air Force 6-2 bomber in February 2008 is a dramatic example
of measurement-based decisions leading to catastrophe.
Performance requirement: Altimeter ± 75 feet of field elevation.
Actual reading: + 136 feet of field elevation at take-off.
• The proximate cause of the crash
was moisture in the Air Data
System (ADS) which introduced
large errors during a field
calibration of several Port
Transducer Units onboard the
aircraft
• The measurement procedure did
not account or mitigate for
moisture Component 3
• There was a lack of understanding
regarding how the ADS affects the
aircraft flight safety Component 1
• Although the calibration procedure
was followed, an Incorrect
measurement-based decision led to
the loss of a $1.4 billion asset,
fortunately without loss of life
"Moisture in the MA port transducer unit (PlUs) during an air data calibration
caused an unnecessarily large 'bias' or correction to the air data system. Using
this "moisture distorted" data, the MA flight computers calculated inaccurate
airspeed and a negative angle of attack (AOA) which contributed to an early
rotation and uncommanded pitch-up on takeoff. Loss of all air data resulted in
degraded flight controls response and stability of the MA."
"Three factors contributed to ineffective communication of critical information. First,
the increased requirement for air data calibrations was intermittent, only surfacing as
an issue during deployments that lasted only a few months a year. Second, a
requirement for an air data calibration never caused an aircraft to miss a takeoff. While
maintenance supervisors were concentrating on issues that grounded jets, air data
calibrations never made it to their "Top 10" items of concern. Third, maintenance and
operations personnel interviewed had a functional understanding of the air data
system, but lacked an appreciation for the potential to induce catastrophic errors into
air data sensors. Most of the individuals interviewed by the board viewed the air
data calibration as a mechanism to correct the aircraft altimeters and nothing more.
The board had to consult aircraft design engineers who had not been associated with
the B-2 program for over 10 years to find a level of understanding in the system that
raised concerns over a need to calibrate PTUs on the aircraft."
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Case Study 5 - Hubble Space Telescope
• Hubble Space Telescope
(HST) launched aboard the
Space Shuttle Discovery,
April 24, 1990
• During on-orbit checkout,
the telescope could not be
properly focused
• Ensuing investigation
revealed the primary mirror
was not built to
specifications
• The optical test used to
manufacture mirror was set-
up incorrectly
Component 3
Error was ten times the
specified tolerance
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NASA Technical Memorandum TM-103443, "The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems
Failure Report", November 1990.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery
on April 24, 1990. During checkout in orbit, it was discovered that the telescope could
not be properly focused because of a flaw in the optics. The HST Project Manager
announced this failure on June 21, 1990. Both of the high resolution imaging cameras
(the Wide Field planetary Camera and the Faint Object Camera) showed the same
characteristic distortion, called spherical aberration, that must have originated in the
primary mirror, the secondary mirror, or both.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for
the Office of Space Science and Applications then formed the Hubble Space Telescope
Optical Systems Board of Investigation on July 2, 1990, to determine the cause of the
flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was not detected before launch. The
Board conducted its investigation to include interviews with personnel involved in the
fabrication and test of the telescope, review of documentation, and analysis and test of
the equipment used in the fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The information in TM-
103443 is based exclusively on the analyses and tests requested by the Board, the
testimony given to the Board, and the documentation found during the investigation.
Continued analysis of images transmitted from the telescope indicated that most, if not
all, of the problem lies in the primary mirror. The Board's investigation of the
manufacture of the mirror proved that the mirror was made in the wrong shi3pe, being
too much flattened away from the mirror's center (a OA-wave rms wavefront error at
632.8 nm). The error is ten times larger than the specified tolerance.
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Case Study 5 - Hubble Space Telescope - Measurements
________--"-+L W,C,.,. nns)
RNC
----------------- Nominal
- L (O.O.J nus)
~ "r-
Difference
010.4 nns
INC TRvNC
1
/
Each set of error bars
represent the
measurement process
uncertainly, with 95%
confidence. for the
method used
Data from three different measuring
techniques were available
1. RNC: ±O.O1 rms (Reflective Null
Corrector)
2. RvNC: ±O.02 rms (Refractive Null
Corrector)
3. INC: ±O.14 rms (Inverse Null Corrector)
~ RNC was a high accuracy measurement
system developed specifically for the HST
~ The INC and RvNC are less accurate,
standard mirror measurement systems
~ Both clearly showed the RNC error,
although both were discounted
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High confidence was placed in Method #1. The other two methods were dismissed
(lower confidence). They should not have been dismissed because they had adequate
accuracy to reveal the error. This situation mandates investigation before an
"Acceptance Decision" is made.
"The consistency ofthe data from the INC and the RvNC indicates the presence ofthe
error in the RNC. "
NASA TM-103443 HST Optical Systems Failure Report
Although it seems impossible for less accurate measurement processes to be correct
over an extremely accurate process, the lessons from the Hubble investigation can be
summed up in a movie quote (also from Sherlock Holmes fame).
"Once you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable,
must be the truth. "
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Case Study 5 - Hubble Space Telescope
• According to the HST failure
report, project decision makers
did not understand the accuracy
of critical measurements
• The report also noted a mindset
existed to discount any
independent measurements
with less accuracy than the RNC
• Discounting the INC and RvNC
data was, in essence, "shopping
for the answer they wanted"
• A servicing mission to correct
the error was flown by the
Space Shuttle Endeavor in
December 1993
• Cost of servicing mission was
-$1 billion USD
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While it is true that, "a perfect instrument cannot fix a bad measurement process", a
properly designed and executed Quality Assurance (metrology) program should
reveal the bad measuremen't process before it is placed into use and accepted as
"good".
NASA TM-103443, "The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report",
November 1990.
"What is clear (rom the error that occurred. and the evidence found. is that QA has a
significant role to play in the avoidance ofsimilar problems on future programs. For
this to happen. however. the role ofQA must be understood and seen as a positive
factor by top management. QA organizations must be adequately staffed by fully
qualified individuals, and these people must be given free access to all aspects ofthe
project, from conceptualization through final delivery. They should have clear authority
to stop work on projects where there are unresolved quality issues, They should also
have an independent reporting path to top management to avoid the undue influences
and schedule pressures being imposed by the program or the engineering organizations,
Further, thorough and well-cataloged documentation ofall these aspects ofthe project
must be maintained by the contractor and/or NASA for the duration ofthe mission, To
do otherwise will make recovery ofsalvageable missions improbable or impossible, "
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Considerations and Cautions
Measurements support decisions - accept, reject, rework, scrap, or even
launch a space vehicle. In conformance testing, if a measurement does not
support a decision, it is unnecessary.
Essential Components:
1. Design specifications must be linked to functional requirements
a) Over specification is expensive,
b) Under specification can be hazardous
2. Calibration ensures the accuracy of measuring equipment
a) Links units of measurementto International standards (i.e., provides a pedigree)
3. Measurement processes must control errors that may lead to incorrect
measurement-based decisions
a) Proper selectlon and utilization of measuring equipment
b) Control/mitigate other relevant sources of error in the measurement process
- After all, a perfect instrument does not guarantee good measurement data
----- ------ -- --- -------. - .---------- . ---- _.
The more critical the decision. the more critical the data. The //lore critical the data. the more
critical the measurement.
NASA Refe,vl/"" PI/hlica/iol/ un
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Although no measurement system can provide 100% assurance of conformity, the probability of an undetected non-conformance
can be greatly reduced by using appropriately designed measurement decision rules. The underlying foundation for the best
decision rules is the fundamental tenets of metrology (traceability and uncertainty). Without metrological traceability and
measurement uncertainty, assurance of conformity to specified requirements is greatly reduced and acceptance or rejection
becomes a gamble.
Traceability and uncertainty are the fundamentals of metrology and are essential to assuring quality measurement data. This is
especially true in research and testing where independent validation and minimizing wrong conclusions are important
considerations. Although the fundamentals are important in design, the most crucial step is linking the functional requirements to
the design tolerances. Without this link, the cost of verifying the design tolerances increases without adding value.
The key to achieving an integrated metrology program is to standardize across the entire organization, including researchers,
engineers, and technicians. All elements must be working from the same "playbook" to achieve the maximum benefits, which are
fewer rejected items, less costly inspection processes, higher quality products, etc. The goal of metrology is good decisions based
on reliable measurement data.
Component 1:
Specified tolerances are not created equal. The specification limits can affect measurement quality. Design
specifications must be linked to functional requirements. Without this link, the cost of verifying the measurement
requirements can increase without adding value: or worse, verification of the design performance may not be
adequate.
Component 2:
Know how good the measurement can be made. The selection, care, and utilization of measuring equipment is
essential to the quality of measurement data. Calibration ensures instrument accuracy, as well as establishes the
link for a given measurement to the national or international standard for that unit of measure.
Component 3:
Know how good the measurement needs to be. The criticality of the measurement is the same as the
criticality of the decision. All measurements have some degree of doubt (uncertainty). Adequate measurement
processeslprocedures are necessary to control errors which could lead to incorrect decisions based on
measurement data.
